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Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value
Cards and Other Electronic Payments Products
By Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T Middlebrook, and Broox W Peterson*
Stored-value and other electronic and Internet payments products are joining
credit and debit cards in replacing a significant number of cash transactions in the
economy' Wal-Mart's announcement in June 2007 that it plans to offer reloadable
prepaid or stored-value cards using technology and services from Green Dot Mon-
eyPack and GE Money Bank could be a dramatic step in that direction.2 In addi-
tion, Wal-Mart plans to allow individuals to load and reload their paychecks onto
* Members of the Electronic Payments Working Group, Committee on Cyberspace Law, Section of
Business Law, American Bar Association. The Working Group thanks the Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington and three members of the class of 2007-Kevin M. Halter, Jennifer Rodibaugh, and
Robert Van Wert-for research support for this Survey
Broox W Peterson was Senior Vice President and Assistant General Counsel with Visa from 1983
to 2005. He currently is in private practice providing payments regulation counseling and transaction
support services. He is responsible for Part 1I of this Survey titled "Federal Preemption of State Con-
sumer Protection Regulation." Research for Part II is current through October 19, 2007.
Stephen T. Middlebrook is Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury; he is co-chair of the
Working Group on Electronic Payments Systems, ABA Committee on Cyberspace Law (2006-present).
He is responsible for Part Ill.A.1 titled "The Prosecution of E-gold Ltd. and the Definition of Money
Transmitter" and for Part III.B. Mr. Middlebrook's research is current through July 9, 2007. The views
in this Survey are those of Mr. Middlebrook alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury.
Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law at the Indiana Univer-
sity School of Law-Bloomington. She is the author of Part I of the Survey titled "New State Gift Card
and Payroll Card Legislation," for Part III.A.2 titled "The FTC Consent Decrees with Kmart and Darden
Restaurants, Inc. for Their Gift Card Programs," for Part III.A.3 titled "The Federal Injunction Action
Against Payment Processing, LLC," and for Part II1.C titled "The Federal Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006." She has served as co-chair of the Working Group on Electronic Payments
Systems of the ABA Committee on Cyberspace Law since 2006. She was chair from 2000-2006. She was
a senior attorney in the Division of Credit Practices (now Financial Practices), Bureau of Consumer
Protection at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission prior to joining the Indiana University School of Law
faculty. Her experience with payments products issues began in 1974. Her research for this Survey
covers the period from June 1, 2006 to August 20, 2007. The views expressed by Professor Hughes
are hers alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Indiana University
The authors invite readers to direct questions on each part of this Survey to the individual author
named above as being primarily responsible for its content. Copies of many of the documents cited
in this Survey may be found on the Electronic Payments Working Group's web page at http://www.
abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com_CL320040.
1. See RobertJ. Samuelson, The Vanishing Greenback, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 2007, at 35.
2. Marc Hochstein & William Launder, Green Dot To Reload New Wal-Mart Card, AM. BANKER, June 8,
2007, http://www.americanbanker.com/aricle.html?id=200706072H318PM1. The article reports that
Green Dot's MoneyPak technology is sold at more than 40,000 retail locations in the United States. Id.
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new Wal-Mart card products for a one-time fee of $8.94, which buys the card. 3
An additional monthly service fee of $4.94 will apply in any month in which
the cardholder fails to place $1,000 or more on the card.4 Reloads accomplished
through check cashing at Wal-Mart or direct deposit are free of charge, but reloads
accomplished by other means will cost $4.64 each.5 As one commentator summed
it up, "there is no supply chain, product chain or merchandise management
issue there. It is just cash and digital cash. There's money to be made in money"6
Indeed, it is probable that Wal-Mart can make more money selling prepaid cards
than in selling low-price consumer products.7 Issuers expect that prepaid cards
will increase in popularity, in part because approximately 28 million people in
the United States-or nine percent of the population--do not maintain bank ac-
counts.' Wal-Mart's inexpensive, reloadable stored-value cards will offer a widely
available alternative to the conventional deposit account.
In last year's Survey ("2006 Survey"), we presented developments in the law
pertaining to stored-value cards and other prepaid products from 2002 through
roughly May 31, 2006. 9 This year, we have expanded the scope of our Survey to
encompass developments in Internet payments, other non-paper based payments
such as "demand drafts," and e-gold transfers. Despite the fact that only one year
has passed since our 2006 Survey on stored-value cards, there have been significant
developments in each of the subject areas it covered. Our goals for this Survey are
much the same as for the 2006 Survey: we want to present salient developments
in a fashion that will be helpful to general practitioners as well as specialists who
want to stay abreast of developments in payments and e-commerce.
Readers of the 2006 Survey will recall that we discussed the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's extension of deposit insurance to payroll and gift cards.'"
We also covered the Federal Reserve Board's extension of Regulation E to cover
payroll cards. 11 The second part of the 2006 Survey discussed recent state laws and
regulations covering the terms and conditions of gift cards and the use of payroll
cards to discharge wage and salary obligations. 12 It also gave a comprehensive list-
ing of state laws pertaining to gift cards, payroll cards, and a brief update on Anita
3. Ylan Q. Mui, Wal-Mart Expands Banking Services, WASH. POST, June 21, 2007, at DI.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Wal-Mart's Digital Money Card, DIGITA MONEY WoRLD, June 12, 2007, httpJ/wwwdigitalmoney-
world.com/wal-marts-digital-money-card/ (quoting bbcamerican.blogspot.com).
7. Posting of Ron Galloway to The Huffington Post, The Blogs, http://www.huffingtonpost.coml
ron-galloway/how-walmart-got-its-bank b 54530.html (July 1, 2007, 4:24 PM EST).
8. Kathy Chu &Jayne O'Donnell, Wal-Mart To Offer Payment Cards: Prepaid Visa-Branded Cards To
Target Customers Who Don't Have Bank Accounts, USA TODAY, June 7, 2007, at Al (citing statistic from
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
9. See Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox W Peterson, Developments in the
Law Concerning Stored Value and Other Prepaid Payment Products, 62 Bus. LAw. 229 (2006) [hereinafter
"Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey"].
10. Id. at 231-35.
11. Id. at 235-38.
12. Id. at 239-43.
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Ramasastry's 2001 Survey of Cyberspace Law article on escheat statutes. 3 The
third part took on the task of describing the ongoing battles between the states
and federal bank regulators over federal preemption and, more specifically, over
who should regulate stored-value cards issued by or in conjunction with federally
chartered depositary institutions and their wholly owned subsidiaries.' 4
This year's Survey takes up some of these subjects, and adds a few new subjects
as well. Part I addresses developments since our 2006 Survey in state gift and
payroll card laws. Part II updates developments concerning the federal regulation
of federally chartered financial institutions, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court's
April 2007 ruling in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.," which favored federal pre-
emption. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the precedent establishing that federal
regulators of federally chartered financial institutions have exclusive visitorial
rights-that is, rights to examine, supervise, and enforce both state and federal
laws-over those institutions and their subsidiaries." The Watters opinion is di-
rectly relevant to the attempts by state regulators to apply their own states' con-
sumer protection regulations to gift cards and other payments products offered by
federally chartered depositary institutions, their subsidiaries, and their business
partners. Watters leaves a smaller number of depositary and non-depositary enti-
ties subject to state enforcement of the new laws regulating these products being
enacted by state legislatures. Part III covers important developments involving
other electronic payments systems including the federal prosecution of e-gold
Ltd., which is a payments and stored-value provider; the U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission's action against and subsequent consent decree with Kmart and Darden
Restaurants, Inc. over their gift card programs; and this year's developments in
the federal injunction action against Payment Processing, LLC, a non-depositary
provider of payments processing to telemarketers. This part also covers other
e-currency, Internet, and electronic payments issues, including (1) emerging con-
cerns about the variable definitions of what constitutes a "money transmitter" for
purposes of federal law, (2) enactment of the Federal Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (hereinafter "UIGEA") and developments subsequent
to enactment, and (3) the Federal Reserve Board's decision to exempt debit card
transactions of $15 or less from the requirement in Regulation E to produce a
paper receipt in an electronic funds transfers.
This Survey does not cover issues pertaining to potential money laundering
through stored-value cards raised in the 2007 National Money Laundering Strat-
egy issued jointly by the U.S. Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Home-
land Security 7 We consider it premature to comment prior to the publication of
13. Id. For Professor Ramasastry article, see Anita Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible Treat-
ment of Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New Payment Mechanisms, 57 Bus. LAw. 475 (2001).
14. Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 243-50.
15. 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1567 (2007).
16. Id.
17. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & UNITED STATES
DEPARTMANT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 39-42 (May 3, 2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf (discussing prepaid cards).
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any proposed regulations. We note, however, that government and industry panel
members at the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law Spring Meeting
program titled "Hype or Reality-Anti-Money Laundering Risks from Prepaid Pay-
ment Products and What Can Be Done About Them"'8 unanimously agreed that
the potential for laundering money through stored-value products was negligible.
This Survey also does not cover antitrust implications of payment card systems. 19
1. NEW STATE GIFT CARD AND PAYROLL CARD LEGISLATION
Thirty states now regulate gift cards and nine states regulate payroll cards in
some manner through statutes or regulations.20 The absolute number of new state
gift and payroll card statutes since the 2006 Survey is smaller than the number of
statutes that existed at the time of the 2006 Survey. Other states considered but
failed to enact new gift or payroll card laws.2' The types of state laws described in
the 2006 Survey continue with the new statutes. There is still a remarkable dispar-
ity in the treatment of substantive consumer protection issues and in the location
and format of required disclosures. In the 2006 Survey, we summarized those is-
sues on which state laws varied the most. This year, we will focus on presenting
the newest gift and payroll card legislation.
A. RECENT STATE GIFT CARD LAWS: LOTS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, LOTS OF DETAILS
Apart from applying their state escheat or "money transmitter"22 laws to stored-
value cards, states continue to show interest in regulating the expiration, dor-
mancy, fee disclosure, and other limitations relating to gift cards.23 Since our 2006
Survey, three states-North Carolina, Minnesota, and Utah-have enacted new
laws regulating gift cards in some respect.24 States that previously had enacted
18. The materials from this program may be found on the Electronic Payments Working Group's web
page at http://www.abanet.orgdch/committee.cfm?comCL320040 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The au-
dio from this program can be found at American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, http://www.
abanet.org/buslaw/apps/sentry/sentry cfm?path=/buslaw/meetings/audio/2007/spring/&file= 19.mp3
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
19. For the most recent discussion of the antitrust issues, see generally Pierre V.E Bos, International
Scrutiny of Payment Card Systems, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2006).
20. This Survey does not discuss escheat issues in state regulation. For the most comprehensive
work on state escheat laws and new payment mechanisms, see generally Ramasastry, supra note 13.
21. For a complete listing of all bills introduced in the 2007 legislative sessions, see State Laws and
Regulations, PAYBEFORELEGAL.COM, ay 17, 2007, at 7, paybeforelegal.com.
22. The regulation of stored-value card issuers and sellers as "money transmitters" or "money ser-
vices businesses" is discussed briefly in Part III of this Survey For a more comprehensive discussion of
this subject, see generally Judith Rinearson, Regulation of Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Issued
by Non-Banks Under State "Money Transmitter" Licensing Laws, 58 Bus. LAw. 317 (2002).
23. Some states that regulate prepaid products do not call these products "gift cards." See, e.g., HAw.
REv. STAT. § 481B-13(e) (Supp. 2006).
24. 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 363 (S.B. 1517) (Aug. 17, 2007) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-67.5); 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 93 (S.B. 69) (May 21, 2007); 2007 Utah Laws ch. 19 (H.B. 261)
(Feb. 27, 2007) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4).
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laws governing gift cards in some manner include Arizona, California, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 25 The most recent addi-
tion is in North Carolina, which added gift card-specific provisions to its existing
coverage of gift cards under its abandoned property law.26 This new law only ap-
plies to gift cards that are not issued by financial institutions or are not usable at
multiple unaffiliated sellers of goods or services."
Lawyers who research state gift card laws should be aware that core consumer
protection provisions in some states are found in "escheat" or "abandoned prop-
erty" statutes or in amendments to earlier "gift certificate" statutes, rather than in
freestanding consumer protection statutes with the words "gift card" in their titles.2
This creates a challenge for lawyers as they research gift card laws for clients.
State gift card laws vary considerably with respect to compulsory disclosures
and substantive requirements. Generally, limitations on or requirements for dis-
closures relate to dormancy fees and expiration dates, as well as to the location,
form, and font sizes for disclosures. For a more extensive discussion of these
variables, see our 2006 Survey.29
1. Utah's New Law
One key feature of Utah's new law is that it provides a limited exemption from
some of the requirements for gift cards, instruments, and other records "useable
at multiple, unaffiliated sellers of goods or services if an expiration date is printed
on the gift certificate, instrument or other record. '30 Otherwise, Utah's law desig-
nates the failure to print in a readable manner any expiration date or information
regarding fees to be charged against or deducted from the balance of the gift cer-
tificate, instrument, or record as a "deceptive act or practice."3'
2. Minnesota's New Law
Minnesota's new law makes unlawful the sale of gift certificates, including gift
cards, subject to expiration or any service fees.32 Additionally, the law explicitly
excludes from its scope gift cards issued by employers in recognition of services
performed by employees (essentially as bonuses).33 The law also excludes gift
25. See Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 329 n.64.
26. 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 363 (S.B. 1517) (Aug. 17, 2007) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-67.5).
27. Id.
28. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-56(a), 42-460 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
29. Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, at 239-40.
30. 2007 Utah Laws ch. 19 (H.B. 261) (Feb. 27, 2007) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4).
31. Id.
32. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 93 (S.B. 69) (May 21, 2007).
33. Id.
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certificates or cards issued by federally or state-chartered banks, thrifts, trust com-
panies, or credit unions or any of their affiliates.34 Finally, the Minnesota law ex-
cludes gift certificates and cards that can be used at more than one seller of goods
or services, provided that the issuer discloses the expiration date and fees.
3
1
3. North Carolina's New Law
North Carolina was among the states reported in the 2006 Survey as having
some law that pertained to gift cards. On August 17, 2007, the General Assembly
adopted additional gift card-specific provisions that require disclosure of mainte-
nance fees at the time of purchase, require that the disclosures be visible on the
card itself, and prohibit imposition of service fees for the first 12 months after pur-
chase.36 The new law also provides that a seller or issuer who violates its require-
ments will commit an unfair trade practice under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 and
be subject to a civil penalty in accordance with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2. 3' These
provisions do not apply to gift cards issued by financial institutions or their op-
erating subsidiaries or to cards usable at multiple unaffiliated sellers of goods or
services.
3 8
As the second part of our 2006 Survey explained, state regulations on gift cards
contain varied requirements for and restrictions on the sale of gift cards.3 9 Many
regulations require certain disclosures as a precondition to charging fees or al-
lowing expiration of the value stored. 4° To the extent that states continue to enact
different regulatory requirements, the burden on depositary and non-depositary
issuers and marketers of gift cards will increase and the pressure they may place on
Congress or the states to adopt a uniform standard is likely to grow more intense.
B. NEW STATE PAYROLL CARD LEGISLATION: ALSO MORE
PROTECTION AND LOTS OF DETAILS
Our 2006 Survey reported that seven states, including Michigan and Minnesota,
have enacted laws or promulgated regulations governing the payment of wages by
payroll cards, rather than by direct deposit or check, or have otherwise regulated
the use of payroll cards. 41 Among these seven states, two states have regulations
as opposed to legislation on the use of payroll cards.12 Since the 2006 Survey,
34. Id.
35. Id. It is unclear whether this provision applies only to non-depositary issuers or also to deposi-
tary issuers.




39. Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 240-41.
40. Id. at 240.
41. Id. at 241.
42. Delaware and Nevada have regulations on payroll cards. 65-400-013 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 1-3
(2007); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 608.135 (2007). This Survey does not discuss state escheat laws that ap-
ply to payroll cards.
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Kansas and Maryland have joined the list of states regulating payroll cards, with
Maryland's statute becoming effective on January 1, 2007.11 In 2006, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico included payroll cards on its legislative agenda to cut
down on government expenses. 4 In addition, Minnesota has extended the expi-
ration date of the law discussed in the 2006 Survey to May 31, 2008."5 Virginia
has enacted a law allowing the state comptroller to require either direct deposit of
state employee wages or payment through payroll cards.
46
State law conditions regarding payroll cards differ substantially from state to state.
Three features of state payroll card laws warrant special mention: (1) employee
choice versus compulsory use, (2) full availability of wages, and (3) fee-free use of
the compensation paid or pre-disclosed fee requirements for payroll paid by debit
cards. These continue to be the primary issues addressed by the new state laws on
payroll cards.
1. Wages in Stored-Value Form: Can Employees Still Choose?
The issue of mandatory versus voluntary acceptance of debit cards by employ-
ees remains a hot issue in state payroll card legislation. In states such as Min-
nesota,47 employees have the option of being paid by electronic fund transfers
to payroll card accounts. 48 Minnesota also requires that employees voluntarily
consent in writing to the payroll card method of payment.
49
Recent Federal Reserve Board Regulation E amendments may have resolved the
"choice" issue for payroll cards because of the Board's refusal to budge on the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act's longstanding prohibition on compulsory use.50 Despite
the position taken by the Board of Governors on the "choice" issue, Kansas's new
payroll card law added payroll cards to the optional means by which employers may
pay wages and salaries,5' but it gives employers sole discretion to choose the means
of payment.52 Kansas requires employers who elect to pay employees with payroll
cards to provide "at least one means of fund access withdrawal per pay period at no
cost to the employee for an amount up to and including the total amount of the em-
ployee's net wages .... 5 3 A unique feature of the new Kansas law is its requirement
that employers adopting direct deposit or payroll card payments either conduct
43. 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 132 (H.B. 2316) (Apr. 16, 2007) (amending Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-
314); 2006 Md. Laws ch. 458 (May 16, 2006) (H.B. 388) (amending MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-502).
44. 2006 P.R. Laws ch. 103 (H.B. 2454) (May 26, 2006).
45. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 87 (S.B. 1495) (May 18, 2007) (amending 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 158, § 4).
46. 2007 Va. Acts ch. 847 (H.B. 1650) (Apr. 4, 2007).
47. MINN. STAT. §§ 177.23, 177.255 (2006).
48. Id. § 177.255, subd. 5.
49. Id. § 177.255, subd. 6.
50. 12 C.ER. § 205.10(e)(2) (2007) ("No financial institution or other person may require a con-
sumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic funds transfers with a particular institution as a
condition of employment or receipt of a government benefit.").
51. 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 132 (H.B. 2316) (Apr. 16, 2007) (amending Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-314).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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employee forums to educate employees or distribute educational materials not less
than 30 days prior to implementing a payroll card or direct deposit program.
5 4
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as part of a comprehensive cost-savings
plan, authorized the government to "create incentives for development of technol-
ogy by promoting that every disbursement of public funds be conducted through
electronic means." Puerto Rico also has authorized its Department of the Treasury
to establish a mechanism for payment through "electronic cards" of wages for
employees who do not "wish" to receive wages through deposits to personal bank
accounts 
5
2. Full Availability of Wages Paid with Payroll Cards:
Paying To Get Paid, or Not?
"Full availability" is the second issue. States such as Minnesota require that the
"employee who chooses to be paid wages by electronic fund transfer to a payroll
card account... be permitted to withdraw by a free transaction from the employ-
ee's payroll card account[] an amount up to and including the total amount of the
employee's entire net pay, as stated on the employee's earnings statement."" This
presents a potential problem for the employee who earned, for example, $282.32
in a specific pay period because ATM machines only dispense amounts in round
denominations of $10 or, predominantly, $20 bills. Thus, in a state such as Min-
nesota, an employee wishing to obtain all of his or her wages could do so by using
the card in a retail transaction or by receiving cash back from a retailer, such as a
grocery store, in a pin-based transaction. Alternatively, the employee could pay a
fee to a depositary institution in order to obtain the "total amount" of his or her
net pay Despite the availability of these options, Minnesota law does not address
how an employee may obtain that last increment of his or her pay, $2.32 in the
above example, without encountering some inconvenience or possibly incurring
a fee. Since our 2006 Survey, no state has clarified this issue and it remains unclear
to us whether "full availability" of net pay is a serious problem or merely a theoret-
ical concern. At least one new service offered since our 2006 Survey suggests that
it is a real issue. Discover Financial Services and First Data Corp. have announced
new payroll products with "pay-to-the-penny" payroll services.
57
3. "Fee-Free" Use of Payroll Cards: Getting It All, or Not?
The third issue is "free access to or use of' wages. 58 As we explained in our 2006
Survey, some states require that employees be able to get wages without incurring
54. Id.
55. 2006 PR. Laws ch. 103 (H.B. 2454) (May 26, 2006).
56. MINN. STAT. § 177.255, subd. 4 (2006).
57. Discover Financial Services Announces Agreement with First Data To Issue Discover Network Payroll
Cards by Money Network, BUSINESS WIRE, June 11, 2007, http://www.businesswire.com. The new system
also allows check-writing capacity via Money Network Checks, access to a large ATM network, direct
deposit, and money transfers from the United States to Mexico and Latin America. Id.
58. For more information on Regulation Es prohibition on compulsory use, see Hughes, Middle-
brook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 237-38 & nn. 56-58.
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associated fees. 59 Minnesota prohibits employers from charging their employees
fees for the "initiation, participation, loading, or [receipt of] wages in an elec-
tronic fund transfer to a payroll card account."6° Similarly, the 2007 Kansas law
prohibits employers from charging "initiation, loading or other participation fees
to receive wages payable in an electronic fund transfer to a payroll card account,
with the exception of the cost required to replace a lost, stolen or damaged payroll
card." 6' In comparison, Maryland does not prohibit fees but instead requires the
employer to disclose any fees applicable to payroll debit cards or card accounts in
writing in at least 12-point font.62
The recent spate of new gift and payroll card laws signal that the states see the
need for more gift and payroll card regulation. As the next part of this Survey ex-
plains, the reach of these new state laws is likely to be more limited than would
appear on first reading.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION REGULATION
The federal system established under the U.S. Constitution was an innova-
tion in government that permits and encourages multiple levels of government,
national and state. 63 Because of overlapping constituencies of state and federal
jurisdictions with independent law-making authority,64 conflict "is perpetually
arising and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system exists."65 Our
2006 Survey discussed in some depth the attempts by states to regulate the gift
card and other programs of federally chartered financial institutions, the litigation
involving those attempts, and the federal regulatory response. 66 Following publi-
cation of our 2006 Survey, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the preemption issue
and may have decided the issue as a legal matter, if not as a political one. 67 Ad-
ditionally, there have been appeals in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and
Second Circuits from district court decisions in New Hampshire and Connecticut,
respectively, involving attempts by the states to regulate co-branded prepaid card
programs involving national banks and/or a federal savings association.'
59. E.g., 65-400-013 DEL. CODE REGS. § 2.0 (2007). For employees who do not maintain their own
bank accounts, Delaware also provides that the employer, upon a written request from the employee,
may deposit funds into an individual bank account assigned to the employee, but requires that "[closts
associated with accounts established for the unbanked employee who voluntarily participates in the
payroll debit card individual account program must be under reasonable circumstances." Id. § 3.0.
60. MINN. STAT. § 177.255, subd. 12 (2006).
61. 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 132 (H.B. 2316) (Apr. 16, 2007) (amending Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-314).
62. Mo. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMEL. § 3-502 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
63. Richard Briffault, Federalism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAw 299, 299 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 2002) ("Before 1787, political thinkers did not believe two govemments could have direct
authority over the same people.").
64. See id.
65. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
66. Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 243-50.
67. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
68. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007); SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F
Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, No. 05-4711 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2007).
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Part II will discuss the background of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., as well as decisions in the First and Second Circuits
pertaining to gift card programs6 and the shift of the battlefield from the courts to
Congress.
A. FEDERALISM-YES I CAN, No You CAN'T
Preemption jurisprudence entangles the judiciary in the difficult task of ensur-
ing the survival of two fundamental but inherently conflicting values embodied in
the U.S. Constitution: how does the Constitution permit states, as sovereign pow-
ers, to regulate local conduct, but yet enable the national government to preempt
parochial state regulation that harms the national interest?7 ° In cases where pre-
emption questions arise out of business regulation enacted by Congress, the role
of the judiciary is eased considerably71 Under the Commerce Clause,72 Congress
has extensive power to enact federal legislation that supercedes state regulation, 73
although that power is limited in part by the Tenth Amendment, which reserves
certain powers to the states.7 4 In cases where Congress has enacted legislation in
an area within its authority, the judiciary's task is to ascertain whether Congress
intended to preempt state action in that area in accordance with the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.75 Because Congress does not address preemption in leg-
islation very often, the answer is not always clear cut. If Congress has not explicitly
addressed preemption, the judiciary is required to "determine congressional intent
based on its analysis of the general purposes of the federal statute and the relation-
ship between those general purposes and the state action at issue."76 This effort is a
69. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (lst Cir. May 30, 2007).
70. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power
To Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PIrr. L. REV. 607, 611 (1985).
71. In matters where Congress has not acted, the judiciary must employ the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, an area beyond the scope of this Survey For an excellent discussion of this topic, see
id. at 614-21.
72. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
73. In 1995, the Rehnquist Court began to place limits on congressional exercise of powers that it
felt stretched the Commerce Clause too far. These decisions were in cases where Congress regulated
non-commercial matters. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-17 (2000) (strik-
ing down Congress's attempt to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to provide federal
remedies for violence against women); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-67 (1995) (striking
down Congress's attempt to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to prevent individuals
from knowingly carrying weapons in school zones). This trend continued until 2002, but since then
may have slowed. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1763, 1763
(2006). However, nothing in these decisions tampered either with the assumption that Congress has
broad powers under the Commerce Clause in the area of business regulation or with previous Supreme
Court jurisprudence in this area. Id. at 1779-80; Briffault, supra note 63, at 301.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,149 (2000) (noting that even where
Congress has "legislative authority over the subject matter," Congress cannot act through statutes that
"violatelJ the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment"). See also Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 712, 748 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot, in regulating commerce under Article
1, make nonconsenting states subject to claims in state courts because doing so violates the sovereign
immunity of the states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that Congress
cannot require states to enforce a federal regulatory scheme).
75. U.S. CONST. an. VI, cl. 2.
76. Pierce,Jr., supra note 70, at 621.
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case-by-case matter. As a general rule, in the absence of an explicit congressional
statement of preemptive intent, courts apply a presumption in favor of state pow-
ers, or federalism. 77 The presumption "is not triggered when the State regulates
in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence."78 The
Supreme Court's decisions finding preemption typically fall into three categories:
those in which the Court finds congressional intent to preclude state regulation
either by explicit statement or implicitly due to the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme; those involving direct conflicts between the requirements of
the state and federal laws; and those where the state's regulatory action frustrates
the policies underlying the federal regulation. 79
B. OCC PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION-CAN IT?
Congress often delegates to agencies the power to interpret federal legislation.
The courts normally grant deference to the actions of regulatory agencies because
of the superior expertise of agency officials.80 However, courts do not always af-
ford deference to an agency's finding that state law has been preempted by federal
legislation.8'
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") in 2004
adopted preempting regulations broadly denying states any role in regulating the
banking activities of national banks or their operating subsidiaries.82 The OCC
77. "[Blecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed
that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,' we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be su-
perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).
78. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). Regulation of federally chartered financial
institutions has been once such area. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F3d 556, 560
n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that there is no presumption against preemption), aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 1559
(2007); Nat'l City Bank v. Turnbaugh, 463 F3d 325,330 (4th Cir. 2006) (deferring to agency interpre-
tation even though agency erroneously thought that it should apply presumption against preemption);
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F3d 305, 314-15 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that presumption
against federal preemption disappears upon judicial review in fields of regulation that have been
"substantially occupied by federal authority for an extended period of time" such as with regard to the
regulation of federally charted banks), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2093 (2007).
79. PierceJr., supra note 70, at 621-22.
80. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984) Iherein-
after "Chevron"]; United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) ("where Congress has commit-
ted to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his
action thereon, whether it involves questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless
he has exceeded his authority or... his action was clearly wrong" (internal quotations omitted)).
81. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (noting in dicta that courts
must always decide de novo whether federal agency regulation preempts state law); Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker,
411 F3d 1289, 1300 (1 th Cir.) (holding that agency decisions on preemption are not entitled to Chevron
deference), vacated, 433 F3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005); Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F2d
1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1991) ("However, a preemption determination involves matters of law-an area
more within the expertise of the courts than within the expertise of the Secretary of Transportation.").
82. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1917
(Dep't of Treasury Jan. 13, 2004) (amending 12 C.ER. pts. 7 & 34). This Survey covers the amendments
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regulations preempted state laws to the extent they "obstruct, impair, or condition
a national bank's ability to fully exercise.., powers"8 3 granted to national banks in
the National Bank Act.84 The regulations were immediately challenged as over-
reaching. 85 In its supporting analysis that accompanied the final adoption of the
rule, the OCC argued that it was merely restating the current state of the law in
the area of National Bank Act preemption. 6 This contention, however, has been
challenged by commentators on a number of grounds.8
Our 2006 Survey discussed several cases in which one of the issues was the
OCC's ability to preempt state regulations applicable to prepaid card programs or
mortgage-lending operations. 8 Since the publication of the 2006 Survey, several
appeals from those decisions have been argued. A decision in the Supreme Court
in one of these cases has swept aside many of the questions that have been raised
about the authority of the OCC (and, with respect to federally chartered savings as-
sociations, the Office of Thrift Supervision or "OTS") to preempt state regulation.
1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.
From 1997 to 2003, Wachovia Mortgage was a subsidiary of Wachovia Corpo-
ration, a financial holding company, and was registered under Michigan's Mortgage
Brokers, Lenders and Servicers Licensing Act ("MBLSLA"). 89 In 2003, Wachovia
to Part 7, which address deposit taking, non-real estate lending, and other activities. Amendments to
Part 34, which address real estate lending of national banks, are not addressed in this Survey
83. 12 C.ER. § 7.4009(b) (2007).
84. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
85. See Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 244-50, for a discussion
of the circumstances accompanying this adoption.
86. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, supra note 82, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1910-11.
87. Generally, the commentators contend that: (i) the OCC rules constitute "field" preemption,
which is inconsistent with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and expressions by Congress that
national banks are subject to state laws, except those that prevent or impair significantly (rather than
merely add an additional regulatory layer onto) the exercise of powers granted to national banks; (ii)
the effect of the OCC preemption rules will be to eliminate any meaningful state-chartered bank-
ing sector, as banks will seek national bank charters to escape state regulation, eliminating a source
of innovation in banking that the dual-banking system has promoted; (iii) the OCCs preemption
determinations are inherently suspect as involving a conflict of interest since the effect is to increase
the OCC's importance as more banks seek federal charters and the protection of the OCC against the
states; and (iv) this conflict of interest will also result in consumer harm as the OCC will be reluctant
to take harsh enforcement action against the banks it regulates. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The OCCs Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking
System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004); Vincent DiLorenzo, Fed-
eralism, Consumer Protection and Preemption: A Case for Heightened Judicial Review (2007), http://ssm.
com/abstract=796147.
88. Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 245-48. The similar authority
of the Office of Thrift Supervision with respect to federal savings associations was also at issue in some
of these cases. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
89. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1565 (2007). For the relevant Michigan law,
see MICH. ComP. LAws § 445.1651 (2006). This law was enacted in response to extensive predatory
lending abuse in Michigan. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct.
1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342). The registration requirement was a special provision for subsidiaries of
financial institutions subject to federal regulation and did not require the background investigations,
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Mortgage became a subsidiary of Wachovia Bank, N.A., and thereafter claimed ex-
emption from the Michigan registration requirement on the ground that the state
regulation was not applicable to an operating subsidiary of a national bank.9 ° Mich-
igan disagreed and tried to shut down Wachovia Mortgage for non-registration.
In the ensuing litigation, the district court91 and the court of appeals 92 agreed with
Wachovia Bank that the Michigan law was preempted by OCC regulations.
Michigan filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court in
which it argued that the OCC did not have the power under the National Bank Act
to extend its preemption rule to operating subsidiaries, and that the lower courts
should not have given deference to the OCC rules.93 The essence of Michigan's ar-
gument was that section 484(1) of the National Bank Act expressly grants exclusive
"visitorial" (e.g., regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement) rights to the OCC over
national banks, but not to their affiliates, meaning that Congress had not intended
to grant the OCC exclusive regulatory authority over operating subsidiaries.94
Therefore, Michigan argued, the OCC's rules extending preemption to operating
subsidiaries were not entitled to Chevron deference, 95 upon which both of the lower
courts relied in upholding the OCC regulations, because "the Court must reject an
agency interpretation of a statute that is contrary to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."9 6 The Supreme Court granted Michigan's petition.97
proofs of financial responsibility, minimum net worth requirements, annual examinations, or opera-
tional restrictions applicable to other types of licensees. The registration did give Michigan the power to
investigate complaints against the registrant if it deemed that an investigation of the complaint by the
federal regulator was inadequate. Id. at 7.
90. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565. For the relevant federal regulation, see 12 C.ER. § 7.4006 (2007)
("Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank op-
erating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.").
91. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F Supp. 2d 957, 965 (WD. Mich. 2004).
92. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2005).
93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-22, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006)
(No. 05-1342).
94. Michigan argued, among other things, that nowhere else in the National Bank Act does the
term "national bank" include its affiliates, which are separately addressed in the statute, and that
operating subsidiaries (a type of affiliate) that do not have national bank charters are therefore not
included within the exclusive visitorial rights granted in § 484(a), and thus can be subject to state
regulation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 93, at 8-9. Michigan further argued that Con-
gress has not modified the original language in § 484(a), despite several opportunities to do so, most
recently in 1983. Id. at 13-14. For the relevant section of the U.S. Code, see 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000)
("No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law....")
(emphasis added).
95. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 93, at 10 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). Michigan
also argued that, to the extent that the intent of Congress was deemed ambiguous, the lower courts
did not apply the required presumption that state regulation was not intended to be preempted, or
adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court's dicta that agency interpretations involving preemption decisions
are subject to de novo judicial review. Id. at 16, 23. For the Supreme Court's dicta, see, for example,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,475, 484-85 (1996), and Smiley v Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 744 (1996). Michigan also argued that the OCC was prohibited from preempting state regulation
under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
93, at 22-25, but this argument was ultimately summarily rejected by the Supreme Court. Watters,
127 S. Ct. at 1573.
97. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006).
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Respondents Wachovia Bank and Wachovia Mortgage argued in their brief that
preemption of Michigan's law derives from a different section of the National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24,98 one that grants national banks, in addition to the specific
powers enumerated in the Act, "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking."99 The OCC in 1966 specified that one of
these incidental powers included the ability to use operating subsidiaries to en-
gage in banking activities.l"' Wachovia argued that the OCC had the authority to
make such a determination and furthermore that the determination was entitled
to deference under Chevron.'0 ' Therefore, Wachovia argued, Michigan's attempt to
regulate Wachovia's operating subsidiary would be tantamount to regulating the
exercise by the national bank of one of its enumerated powers under the National
Banking Act. This, Wachovia maintained, could not be allowed because "[t]he
Court has long 'interpret[edI grants of both enumerated and incidental 'powers' to
national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily
pre-empting, contrary state law."' 02 Moreover, Wachovia argued, the regulation of
national banks is an area where there is an extensive history of federal presence
(going back as far as McCulloch v. Maryland,'10 3 decided in 1819). 101 Thus the pre-
sumption against preemption would not apply in cases involving national bank
regulation,' and in fact Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson10 6 would require quite the
opposite presumption. 17
Regarding Michigan's argument that section 484 of the National Bank Act does not
expressly give the OCC exclusive visitorial authority over operating subsidiaries,
Wachovia argued that the use of operating subsidiaries did not exist as an inciden-
tal power of national banks until 1966. Therefore, Congress's failure to mention
them in various amendments to the National Bank Act before that date cannot
be taken as evidence of congressional intent. 10 8 Further, Wachovia argued that
Congress acknowledged the power of national banks to use operating subsidiaries
"subject to the same terms and conditions that apply to such activities when con-
ducted by the bank" in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act' 9 enacted in 1999.110
98. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000).
99. Brief for the Respondents at 4, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No.
05-1342).
100. See Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations Corporation, 31 Fed.
Reg. 11459 (Dep't of Treasury Aug. 31, 1966) (amending 12 C.ER. § 7.10).
101. NationsBank, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2 (1995) (affording
Chevron deference to an OCC determination).
102. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 99, at 21 (quoting Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25, 32 (1996)).
103. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 438 (1819).
104. Id. at 21-24.
105. See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
106. 517 U.S. at 34.
107. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 99, at 24.
108. Id. at 28-29.
109. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 301, 113 Stat. 1338, 1407 (1999) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 6711 (2000)).
110. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 99, at 18-20.
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The Supreme Court sided with Wachovia and upheld the lower courts in a
5-3 decision."' The Supreme Court agreed that the use of operating subsidiaries
is an incidental power of national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24 and that, under
Barnett,"12 the Michigan law was an impermissible restraint on the exercise of
that power and therefore preempted." 3 The Court held, "Isitates are permitted
to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or
significantly interfere with the national bank's or the national bank regulator's ex-
ercise of its powers. But when state prescriptions significantly impair the exercise
of authority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State's regulations must
give way"" 4 The Supreme Court adopted and agreed with most of the respon-
dents' other arguments, although it did not address the issue of the validity of the
OCC regulations or any required deference to them under Chevron, since it found
that preemption of Michigan law was required under the National Bank Act and
applicable authority, regardless of the OCC regulations."15
2. State Prepaid Card Regulation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has issued a decision in SPGGC,
LLC v. Ayotte," 6 a case involving an attempt by a state, this time New Hampshire,
to argue that federalism principles should permit state consumer regulation of
gift cards issued by a national bank (U.S. Bank) and a federally chartered savings
association (Metabank) but sold though a mall operator (Simon Property Group).
In some ways reminiscent of Michigan's argument in Watters, New Hampshire ar-
gued to the First Circuit that the mall operator was not a national bank or federal
savings association, but at best an agent of those entities, and thus the mall opera-
tor was subject to the New Hampshire gift card regulations." 7 The OCC filed an
amicus brief on behalf of U.S. Bank, arguing that the use of agents to market and
distribute products was an incidental power of national banks subject to exclusive
OCC supervision, that the features of the products that New Hampshire claimed
violated state law were permitted for national bank products under OCC rules,
and thus New Hampshire's law was preempted under Barnett. 18 Metabank argued
for the same result, although it did so under a different and much more direct
111. "In accord with the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue, we hold that Wachovia's
mortgage business, whether conducted by the bank itself or through the bank's operating subsidiary,
is subject to OCC's superintendence, and not to the licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of the
several States in which the subsidiary operates." Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1564-65.
112. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 99, at 11.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1567 (citing Barnett Bank, N.A., 517 U.S. at 32-34; Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York,
347 U.S. 373, 377-79 (1954)).
115. See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572 n.13.
116. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
117. Brief for Appellant at 12-21, SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007). For
more discussion of the history and issues of this case in the lower courts, see Hughes, Middlebrook &
Peterson, 2006 Survey, supra note 9, at 246-49.
118. Brief for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 13-16, SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
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statutory and regulatory scheme administered by the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion.1 9 The First Circuit found that the New Hampshire law restricted the exer-
cise of the power of both the national bank and the federal savings association to
use agents to sell gift cards, and thus was preempted. 120
On October 19, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
the appeal in SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal.121 In this decision, the Second Circuit
found that certain Connecticut gift card regulations (similar to the New Hamp-
shire laws that were involved in Ayotte) were not preempted with respect to gift
cards issued by Bank of America on behalf of Simon Property Group ("Simon")
in Connecticut, although the court did find a valid claim of preemption of a Con-
necticut law prohibiting expiration dates.122 The Ayotte and Blumenthal decisions
are easily reconciled. As the Second Circuit noted, the Ayotte decision involved gift
cards issued by financial institutions that set the policies and collected the fees that
were alleged to have violated New Hampshire law, whereas in the gift card program
before the Second Circuit in Blumenthal, Simon Property Group set and collected
the fees that violated Connecticut law, not Bank of America. 12 3 The Second Circuit
found that application of the Connecticut gift card regulations to the gift card pro-
gram fees did not have any impact on the exercise of national bank powers by Bank
of America.1 4 The court found that while the Connecticut regulations did have an
impact on Simon, the regulations were not preempted as to Simon because Simon's
conduct "is neither protected under federal law nor subject to the OCC's exclusive
oversight."125 Interestingly, the Second Circuit noted several times that the OCC had
in an amicus brief urged the court to reach that conclusion.2 6 On the other hand,
since the Connecticut prohibition on expiration dates for gift cards would have pre-
vented Bank of America from being able to issue gift cards at all in Connecticut, 27
119. Brief for Metabank at 25-28, SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") is authorized under 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (2000) to provide for
the safe and sound operation of federal savings associations, and has plenary authority to regulate all
aspects of their operations. This regulatory control wholly preempts the field against state regulation.
Conf. of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 921
(1980). The OTS in an opinion letter issued in 2006 expressly preempted state gift card laws in their
application to federal savings associations, mentioning specifically New Hampshire's. John E. Bowman,
Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, United States Department of Treasury, P-2006-3 (June 9,
2006), available at http://164.109.59.122/docs/5/56218.pdf (discussing preemption of state gift card
restrictions). OTS regulations also specifically authorize federal savings associations to "market and
sell, or participate with others to market and sell, electronic capacities and by-products" to third par-
ties. 12 C.ER. § 555.200(b) (2007).
120. SPGGC, LLC v Ayotte, No. 06-2326, slip op. at 14-20, 22-24 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
121. SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, No. 05-4711 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2007).
122. Blumenthal, No. 05-4771, slip op. at 11-12.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 11-12. The Second Circuit further stated, "We do not address whether we would reach
a different conclusion were the fees in question collected and established by the issuing bank rather
than by SPGGC." Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 10-11.
127. These cards were issued under license from Visa U.S.A., Inc., which requires expiration dates
on all cards for fraud control purposes. Id. at 4.
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the Second Circuit remanded the preemption question on that specific issue to the
district court for further consideration.
128
C. FEDERALISM AND FEDERALLY CHARTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The effort by Michigan in Watters to assert a role for state consumer protection
regulation of national bank activities failed, probably inevitably given the history
surrounding the enactment of the National Bank Act and subsequent jurispru-
dence. The National Bank Act was enacted in the context of state hostility to
previous attempts to create a national bank, 2 9 and during congressional debates it
was clear on all sides of the issue that the intent of the Act was to create a class of
banks exclusively under the control of the federal government and immune from
unfriendly state regulation. 30 The Supreme Court early on called these banks
"national favorites," '' and in its opinion in Watters stated, "[iln the years since
the NBAs enactment, we have repeatedly made clear that federal control shields
national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation.'132
Given the expansive possibilities of the incidental powers clause of the National
Bank Act, 133 the OCC's aggressiveness in its interpretation, 134 and the Supreme
Court's history of backing the OCC, it is hard to imagine a case in which the states
could prevail in an argument that their consumer protection regulation should
apply to national banks under federalism principles. The same conclusion seems
applicable to federal savings associations as well.' 3 Because the powers of the
OCC and the OTS are derived from Congress, the remedy for the states in their
federalism concerns would seem to be in Congress, and it is to Congress where
the battle has shifted.
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and House En-
ergy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell on May 11, 2007 wrote
to members of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
128. Blumenthal, No. 05-4711, slip op. at 12-13.
129. Brief of American Bankers Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
8-12, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342).
130. Id. at 9. "The NBA would establish a banking system 'made to operate directly upon the
people independently of State boundaries or State sovereignty,' and 'wholly independent of State au-
thority'" CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1115 (1863) (statement of Rep. Spaulding).
131. Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409,413 (1873).
132. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566-67.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (2000).
134. The OCC's regulatory responsibility is a heavy one given the systemic and financial risk of a
national bank failure, so aggressiveness is probably justifiable caution.
135. There could be another preemption battle looming over nascent state attempts to regulate
the relationship of financial institutions, including federally chartered ones, with merchants accept-
ing credit, prepaid, and debit cards. There are bills introduced in at least seven states that attempt to
cap interchange rates, prohibit the charging of discount or processing fees on the sales tax portion
of a transaction, and/or require disclosure to merchants or consumers of the existence and amount
of interchange fees. See Unfair Credit Card Fees.com, Interchange Legislation in the United States,
2007, http://www.unfaircreditcardfees.com/uploads/State-by-State-Interchange-Activity.pdf (last vis-
ited June 3, 2007).
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation calling for stronger federal-level con-
sumer protection and enforcement. 136 On June 13, 2007, the House Financial
Services Committee held hearings at which it asked federal and state regulators
and enforcement officials to provide testimony concerning how to better protect
consumers from problems such as predatory lending and credit card marketing
abuse. 37 At least one federal regulator took pains in his testimony to explain and
defend the use of regular and comprehensive examinations of federally chartered
financial institutions to nip in the bud potential consumer abuses, with enforce-
ment actions taken only when that (infrequently) fails.' 38
Recent accords between the states and federal financial institution regulators
to share consumer complaints and to cooperate in ensuring resolution received
prominent discussion in testimony by state and federal representatives. 39 State
representatives asked Congress for uniform federal legislation that would accord
the states a role in enforcement against national financial institutions: "because of
our greater collective resources and experience handling consumer complaints,
we believe we can handle consumer complaints more quickly and efficiently than
can the OCC and other federal financial regulators."14' The OCC, however, un-
doubtedly reflected the outlook of other federal regulators with this observation:
It is counterproductive for state officials to focus their finite supervisory and enforce-
ment resources on national banks and their subsidiaries when those institutions are
already extensively supervised by the OCC, and when there are other entities-
many of which answer only to state authorities-that are demonstrably the source
of problems. Returning to the metaphor, you can indeed have too many cops on
the same beat if it means leaving other, more dangerous parts of the neighborhood
unprotected.' 4
As we said before, federalism can be messy
III. RECENT FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS-A YEAR OF ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS, REGULATORY RELIEF, AND THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2006
In addition to the state and judicial developments that have occurred since our
2006 Survey, there have been important actions from Congress, the regulatory
136. Press Release, House Committee on Financial Services, Chairmen Dingell and Frank Call
for Increased Consumer Protection (May 11, 2007), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financials-
vcs.dem/press051107.shtml.
137. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/
ht061307.shtml.
138. Id. (statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. (statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa).
141. Id. (statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency).
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agencies, and federal prosecutors. In this part of the Article, we discuss recent en-
forcement actions and prosecutions, a decision by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to provide regulatory relief for issuers of small dollar value
gift cards, and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006.
A. BIG FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS-THREE KINDS OF
NEW PAYMENTS PRODUCTS ATTRACT GOVERNMENT ATTENTION
This year, the federal government pursued actions against providers of three
different stored-value or other new electronic payment products. These enforce-
ment actions reveal different approaches that federal prosecutors and regulatory
agencies may take when dealing with alleged instances of violations of federal
criminal and consumer protection laws.
1. The Prosecution of E-gold Ltd. and the Definition of
Money Transmitter
In early 2007, the federal government charged e-gold Ltd. and its owners with
violating federal and state laws regarding "money transmission" services. This part
of the Survey describes the e-gold Ltd. business model and the charges made
against the company, and then discusses certain ambiguities in the law pertaining
to "money transmission" businesses.
a. E-gold Ltd. Builds a Successful Business Facilitating
Internet Payments
E-gold Ltd. is an Internet-based system that allows individuals to make do-
mestic and international payments not in dollars or pounds or euros, but rather
in precious metals. 42 Or more accurately, it allows individuals to settle debts by
transferring book entry title to units of a precious metal held in trust by a corpo-
rate affiliate of e-gold.143 Users are given an account dominated in grams of gold 44
and backed (or "purportedly backed" as the government asserts 45) by actual gold
held in trust.'46 Users may pay for purchases by initiating an exchange between
two e-gold accounts. 47 "E-gold appeals to... people who invest in the precious
metal and believe money ought to be anchored to it."' 48 E-gold Ltd. describes its
142. See E-gold Ltd., http://www.e-gold.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
143. Id.
144. Individuals with more eclectic tastes may also purchase e-silver, e-platinum, and e-palladium.
The current exchange rates are available at E-gold Ltd., Exchange Rates, http://www.e-gold.com/cur-
rentexchange.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
145. Indictment at 2, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., Douglas L.
Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf [hereinaf-
ter "Indictment"].
146. See E-gold Ltd., http://www.e-gold.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
147. See id.
148. Brian Grow, Gold Rush: Online Payment Systems lihe E-gold Ltd. Are Becoming the Currency of
Choice for Cybercrooks, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 2006, at 68.
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product as "the world's first electronic currency designed for borderless, electronic
business transactions over the Internet."'49 According to the e-gold Ltd. web site:
The target market for e-gold is simply people who use money How do you presently
use money? Chances are any of these activities would benefit from the increased
soundness, security, efficiency, and lower cost of e-gold. Here are some examples of
how e-gold is presently used:
" e-commerce
" Business-to-business payments





E-gold's promotional materials state that its product is unique because "every
ounce is secured by actual gold bullion held in allocated storage at repositories
certified by the London Bullion Market Association."'15' Title to the bullion is held
by the E-gold Bullion Reserve Special Purpose Trust for the exclusive benefit of
holders of e-gold, e-silver, e-platinum, and e-palladium (collectively "e-metal"). 5 1
E-gold notes in its pleadings that a routine audit of all of the e-metal belonging to
the special purpose trust that took place in April 2007 concluded that the e-metal
issued by defendants was fully backed by bullion in allocated storage.5 3
In 1999, the Financial Times described e-gold as "the only electronic currency
that has achieved critical mass on the web.... For merchants, eGold has a further
bonus: unlike credit cards, which are liable to chargebacks, the system guaran-
tees payment once ordered."1 54 Early write-ups in magazines such as Barronsiss
149. Defendants' Status Report and Notice of Compliance with This Court's Seizure Warrants and
Post-indictment Restraining Order at 5, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.,
Douglas L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. May 17, 2007)
[hereinafter "May Status Report"].
150. E-gold Ltd., Better Money, http://www.e-gold.comunsecure/qanda.htmt (last visited Sept. 6,
2007).
151. May Status Report, supra note 149, at 6.
152. Hildeberto S. de Frias & Michael J. Mello, Mello, Jones, Hollis & Martin, Barristers & Attor-
neys, Declaration of Trust Constituting the E-gold Bullion Reserve Special Purpose Trust § 4.1 (March
31, 2000), http://www.e-gold.com/contracts/egold-spt-1 1 1899.htm.
153. Notice of Filing of Accounting "of all Precious Metals Held" as Required by the Post-Indict-
ment Restraining Order Entered in This Case at 4-5, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver
Reserve, Inc., Douglas L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C.
May 9, 2007).
154. Tim Jackson, When Gold Makes Cents: It May Sound Crazy, but the eGold Payment Mechanism
Based on Deposits of Precious Metal, Is Cheap, Efficient and Easy, FiN. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at 18.
155. "With the global explosion of the Internet and e-commerce, the world needs a new type of
currency. It needs an asset-backed, high-tech money standard, without the political machinations
that hobble the euro, the dollar, the yen and all other traditional currencies.... One company, E-gold,
already allows online users to settle payments using its currency, which is 100% backed by gold." Jack
White & Doug Ramsey, Making New Money, BARRON , April 23, 2001, at 59.
Stored-Value Cards and Other Electronic Payments Products 257
and Wired 5 6 gave e-gold both visibility and credibility Numerous other Internet-
based payment systems came and went while e-gold survived.
5 7
Digital currencies in general, and e-gold in particular, however, developed poor
reputations in some circles and one commentator called the payment systems "at
best, lax on financial crime. " s Criticism of these new payment options was often
harsh:
Skeptics, though, charge that efforts to create currency based on the value of metals
seem designed to skirt standard banking and money-transfer rules while providing
few customer protections and inadequate checks of account-holder identities. They
also point to high fees typically charged by third party companies that support pre-
paid card programs and that exchange gold value for traditional currencies. 59
For better or worse, e-gold's novel business model attracted a lot of attention.
b. E-gold Is Indicted for Money Laundering and Other Offenses
On April 24, 2007, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia handed
down a four-count indictment against e-gold Ltd; its affiliate Gold & Silver Re-
serve, Inc.; and their owners, Dr. Douglas L. Jackson, Reid Jackson, and Barry K.
Downey 60 The government charged each of the defendants with one count of
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, one count of conspiracy to oper-
ate an unlicensed money transmitting business, one count of operating an unli-
censed money transmitting business under federal law, and one count of money
transmission without a license under D.C. law. 1 The government alleged that
"E-gold has been a highly favored method of payment by operators of investment
scams, credit card and identity fraud, and sellers of online child pornography"
and that e-gold facilitated payments "knowing that the funds involved were the
proceeds of unlawful activity .... ,,16 If found guilty, the defendants could face up
to 35 years in prison."'
156. "[ljnvulnerable to government manipulation and subject to the kinds of market forces only a
worldwide, 24/7 open-ended network can bring to bear, e-gold promises not simply better money but
the best: a money supply kept so straight and narrow that it has room for neither bubbles nor crashes."
Julian Dibbel, In Gold We Trust, WIRED, Jan. 2002, at 3, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/lO.01/
egold.html.
157. "DigiCash, the most innovative and best-publicized digital cash scheme, sought bankruptcy
protection in 1998. CyberCash, a competitor, followed that route in 2001, the same year Beenz and
Flooz, two rivals, closed their doors and left holders of their currencies high and dry." Michael Mandel,
Money Ain't What It Used To Be, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 2006, at 74.
158. Nadia Oehlsen, U.S. Law Enforcers Are Cold on Gold, CARDS & PAYMENTS, Apr. 2006, at 45.
159. Id. at 46.
160. Indictment, supra note 145, at 1, 26.
161. Id. at 9, 18, 25, 26.
162. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-gold Indicted for
Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/
Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indict%20PR_042707.pdf [hereinafter "DOJ Press Release"].
163. Larry Greenemeier & Sharon Gaudin, Law Abiding ... or Criminal Enabler?, INFORMATIONWEEK,
May 7, 2007, at 20.
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Count One of the indictment charges the defendants with transmitting mon-
etary instruments or funds involving the proceeds of illegal activity with the intent
of promoting that illegal activity, while knowing that the transactions were de-
signed to conceal the source of the proceeds of the illegal activity 164 At issue are
transfers of e-gold from one account to another that the government alleges facili-
tated the sale of child pornography, stolen credit and debit card information, and
various types of investment fraud, such as ponzi schemes and illegal high-yield
investment programs., 65 The indictment identifies 36 specific e-gold transactions
taking place between August 2000 and December 2005 with dollar values ranging
from $40 to $725,000 that the government asserts were made in support of such
illegal activity 1
66
The remaining three counts of the indictment allege that e-gold operated as
a money transmitter without an appropriate state license, failed to comply with
federal money transmitter regulations, and transmitted funds known to have been
derived from a criminal offense. 67 According to the government, e-gold failed to
obtain a money transmitter's license in the District of Columbia16 as is required
by law. 169 Prosecutors further allege that e-gold ignored federal requirements to
implement an anti-money laundering program 170 and to file reports of suspicious
transactions (so-called "Suspicious Activity Reports" or "SARs") with the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury. 171 The indictment alleges that e-gold failed to verify the
identity of its customers, allowed accounts with obviously bogus names such as
"Mickey Mouse" and "Anonymous Man," hired employees with no experience in
financial services and provided them with little or no training, allowed transac-
tions with suspicious notations such as "child porn" and "CC fraud," and did little
or nothing to stop transactions tied to illegal behavior. 72 As well as being inde-
pendent violations of the law, these offenses constitute a criminal offense under
18 U.S.C. § 1960.173
Although as of August 2007, the criminal prosecution of e-gold is in its early
stages, the government has already won one significant victory. The court ordered
164. Indictment, supra note 145, at 9-10.
165. Id. at 7-8.
166. Id. at 14-18.
167. Id. at 18-19.
168. Id. at 22.
169. Id. at 26 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1001(10) (LexisNexis 2001)).
170. Id. at 5 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (Supp. IV 2004) and its implementing regulations (31
C.ER. § 103.125 (2007)).
171. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (Supp. IV 2004) and its implementing regulations (31 C.ER.
§ 103.20 (2007)).
172. Id. at 7, 11-12.
173. "Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of
an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (Supp. V 2005). Section 1960 was amended in
2001 with an effective date of October 1, 2004, and those amendments may terminate upon an ap-
propriate joint resolution of Congress. Id. Given that some of the actions alleged in support of the indict-
ment occurred before the effective date of the amendment, it is unclear to what degree section 1960 is
applicable to defendants' alleged conduct.
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the seizure of all of the assets of e-gold, including bank accounts, precious metals,
and accounts receivable both in the United States and abroad. 114 The order stated
it should not be construed "as limiting the e-gold operation's ability to use its
existing funds to satisfy requests from its customers to exchange e-gold into na-
tional currency, or its ability to sell precious metals to accomplish the same once
approval has been received." 7 5 Defendants complain, however, that the seizure
order is so broad it has swept up all of their assets, and as a result "they simply
do not have money with which to operate their businesses, pay attorneys' fees,
and pay for reasonable operating and living expenses."17 6 They asked the court
to modify the terms of the warrants,'77 but the court denied their request.'78 De-
fendants have appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. 79
c. E-gold Defends Itself
The e-gold defendants have asserted their innocence:
This is not a story of common criminals operating surreptitiously in a netherworld to
launder money and commit crimes. Rather this is a case about three respected individu-
als-Douglas L. Jackson, M.D., a talented medical doctor; Barry K. Downey, a prominent
lawyer; and Reid A. Jackson, a gifted systems analyst-who took seriously the rights
and liberties guaranteed to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States and
created an alternative global currency and payment system for the betterment of man-
kind. They did so forthrightly and openly, meeting at conferences with world bankers
and representatives of international monetary funds, working hand-in-hand with vari-
ous agencies of the United States government and even testifying on Capitol Hill about
the nature of their business enterprise. They believed-and continue to believe-that
they complied with all laws and regulations applicable to their business.
174. More specifically, the court ordered the seizure of:
All the assets, including without limitation, equipment, inventory, accounts receivable and bank
accounts of EGOLD, LTD. [sic], and GOLD & SILVER RESERVE, INC., whether titled in those
names or not, including, but not limited to all precious metals, including gold, silver, platimum,
and palladium, that "back" the e-metal electronic currency of the EGold [sic] operation, wher-
ever located.
Post-Indictment Restraining Order at 4, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve,
Inc., Douglas L. Jackson, Brian K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. May 23,
2007).
175. Id.
176. Defendants' Motion To Vacate Seizure Warrant and To Modify Restraining Order and Request
for an Evidentiary Hearing at 1, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., Douglas
L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. June 1, 2007).
177. Id.
178. Minute Entry Order at 1, United States v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., Doug-
las L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. June 22, 2007).
179. Defendants' Notice of Appeal and Request for Expedited Consideration at 1-2, United States
v. E-Gold Limited, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., Douglas L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A.
Jackson, Crim. No. 07-109 (D.D.C. June 29, 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3074 (D.C. Cir. July 9,
2007). This appeal is fully briefed and oral argument has been scheduled for October 26, 2007. United
States v. E-Gold, Ltd., No. 07-3074 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 5, 2007) (order setting oral argument).
260 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 63, November 2007
e-gold Ltd and G&SR, which represent an innovative new approach to exchanging
value over the Internet in a global economy, are not subject to existing statutes and
regulations drafted in an earlier day to govern "money transmitting businesses."
1 80
According to e-gold, not only do existing money transmitter laws not apply to
it, several government officials and members of law enforcement concur in that
opinion. 81
One supporter has taken the initiative to create a short video extolling the in-
nocence of e-gold and to post it on the Internet. 82
d. The Proper Application of Money Transmitter Laws to
Cutting-Edge Payment Systems like E-gold Is Less than Clear
Based on the indictment, it appears that the government's theory of this case is
that e-gold constitutes a money transmitter under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, and that fact
triggers compliance obligations with money transmitter requirements found in 31
U.S.C. §§ 5330, 5318(g) and (h), and 31 C.ER. part 103.183 E-gold's position is
that it is not a money transmitter under any definition and thus is not subject to
any of these requirements.184 Resolution of the debate is hampered by the fact that
sections 1960, 5318, 5330, and 31 C.ER. part 103 all contain different definitions of
"money transmitter." The concept in each of the laws is similar, but the details are not
the same. Because e-gold is operating outside the traditional realm of money trans-
mitters, it is necessary to explore the nuances of the statutory definitions in order to
determine whether the laws encompass e-gold. The inconsistencies in the statutes,
coupled with potential criminal penalties in section 1960(a),18 5 make advising clients
who want to implement novel new payment mechanisms a difficult task.
As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2), "money transmitting" includes "transfer-
ring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to
transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile,
or courier."18 6 E-gold asserts that it is not a money transmitter because it does not
facilitate transfers of funds but rather allows users to trade precious metals.i1 7 If,
however, e-gold is held to fall within the definition in section 1960(b)(2), then un-
der section 1960(b)(1)(B), it also must comply with the requirements of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5330. On its face, section 5330 applies to a similar but different category of enti-
ties than section 1960, namely any business that:
180. May Status Report, supra note 149, at 1-2.
181. E.g., May Status Report, supra note 149, at 3.
182. See You Tube, E-gold Digital Currency Testimony, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pvj-Px-
C5RcY (last visited Sept. 6, 2007), and Part 2: E-gold Digital Currency Testimoney [sic], http://www.
youtube.com?v=bU9s97cUAAw (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
183. See Indictment, supra note 145, at 4-5.
184. See May Status Report, supra note 149, at 6-8.
185. "Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns" an ille-
gal money transmitting business may be fined or imprisoned for not more than 5 years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1960(a) (Supp. V 2005).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
187. See May Status Report, supra note 149, at 6-8.
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(A) provides check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting or re-
mittance services, or issues or redeems money orders, travelers' checks, and
other similar instruments or any other person who engages as a business in
the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business
in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage
as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or interna-
tionally outside of the conventional financial institutions system;
(B) is required to file reports under section 5313; and
(C) is not a depository institution (as defined in section 5313(g)).'1
E-gold denies that its activities fall within this definition.'89 The indictment ex-
plicitly alleges that e-gold operates as a "money transmitting business" as defined
in section 1960(b)(2),19' thus suggesting that the government will argue that it is
the controlling definition.
The indictment also asserts that e-gold is required but has failed to implement an
anti-money laundering program under 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h), which would include
filing SARs when appropriate.' 9 ' Subsections 5318(g) and (h), however, only apply
to "financial institutions" as that term is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).192 The
latter subsection divides "financial institutions" into 26 categories, one of which is:
a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an informal
money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitat-
ing the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional
financial institutions system.193
To further complicate matters, the regulations implementing subsections 5318(g)
and (h) classify "money transmitter" as one type of "money services business" or
"MSB." 94 Under the MSB rules, a money transmitter is:
(A) Any person, whether or not licensed or required to be licensed, who
engages as a business in accepting currency, or funds denominated in
currency, and transmits the currency or funds, or the value of the cur-
rency or funds, by any means through a financial agency or institution,
a Federal Reserve Bank or other facility of one or more Federal Reserve
Banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or both,
or an electronic funds transfer network; or
(B) Any other person engaged as a business in the transfer of funds. 95
188. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
189. See May Status Report, supra note 149, at 6-8.
190. Indictment, supra note 145, at 19.
191. Id. at 5.
192. 31 U.S.C. 55 5318(g), (h) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
193. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R) (Supp. IV 2004).
194. 31 CER. § 103.11(uu) (2007). The other MSB categories are currency dealer or exchanger;
check casher; issuer of traveler's checks, money orders, or stored value; seller or redeemer of traveler's
checks, money orders, or stored value; and the U.S. Postal Service. Id.
195. 31 C.ER. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i) (2007).
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The regulations, however, note that the determination of whether a person
qualifies as a money transmitter will depend on the specific facts and circum-
stances:
Generally, the acceptance and transmission of funds as an integral part of the ex-
ecution and settlement of a transaction other than the funds transmission itself (for
example, in connection with a bona fide sale of securities or other property), will not
cause a person to be a money transmitter within the meaning of [this rule].1 96
The MSB regulations suggest that if a business were to operate a legitimate online
electronic commodity exchange dealing in precious metals, the fact that funds
transmissions were made in order to settle the commodity transactions would
not turn the enterprise into a money transmitter. Given that e-gold has already
described itself as "the world's first electronic currency designed for borderless,
electronic business transactions over the Internet,"'197 it is unlikely that e-Gold
could successfully make use of this defense.
E-Gold is being prosecuted, it appears, on an amalgam of all four laws. Because
18 U.S.C. § 1960 exposes individuals to criminal as opposed to civil liability for
the business decisions of their companies, resolution of the ambiguities is essen-
tial for the market of electronic payment products to mature. At a technical level,
failure to clarify the scope of the "money transmitter" laws-all four of them-
coupled with criminal prosecution of businesses and their owners who run afoul
of these laws will likely stifle the development of new electronic money products
or raise compliance costs for new businesses.
2. The FTC Consent Decrees with Kmart and
Darden Restaurants, Inc. for Their Gift Card Programs
Since our 2006 Survey, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has brought its
first two enforcement actions against issuers and marketers of gift cards for practices
related to the card terms-In the Matter of Kmart Corporation, Kmart Services Corpo-
ration, and Kmart Promotions, LLC, corporations'98 and In the Matter of Darden Restau-
rants, Inc., GMRI, Inc., and Darden GC Group, Corp., corporations.199 The FTC made
the consent decree with Darden Restaurants, Inc. final on May 7, 2007.20 Violations
of the consent decrees carry possible civil penalties of $11,000 per violation. 20 1
196. 31 C.ER. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii) (2007).
197. May Status Report, supra note 149, at 5.
198. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Kmart Settles with FTC over Gift Card Sales Prac-
tices (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/03/kmart.shtm.
199. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, National Restaurant Company Settles FTC Charges
for Deceptive Gift Card Sales (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/darden.shtm. Darden
Restaurants, Inc. owns restaurant chains Olive Garden, Red Lobster, Smokey Bones, and Bahama
Breeze. Id.
200. The comment period for the proposed Kman consent decree ended April 10, 2007, and for
the proposed Darden consent decree on May 2, 2007. See supra notes 198 and 199.
201. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Kman Settles with FTC over Gift Card Sales Prac-
tices (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/03/kmart.shtm.
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a. Kmart
The FTC charged that Kmart had promoted the cash-equivalent features of
its gift cards but did not disclose fees it assessed after two years of non-use and
also misrepresented that cards would not expire. 212 The proposed consent decree
requires Kmart not to advertise or sell gift cards without disclosing clearly and
prominently expiration dates or fees in all advertising and on the front of the gift
cards.203 In addition, Kmart must disclose at the point of sale and prior to pur-
chase all material terms and conditions of any expiration date or fee. 2°4 Kmart also
will be required to have a refund program to repay the dormancy fees it charged
without disclosure and to publicize it.
20 5
b. Darden Restaurants, Inc.
The FTC action against Darden Restaurants, Inc. is similar to that against Kmart.
Darden promised that cards could be redeemed for their face value but did not
disclose that dormancy fees would be deducted after a period of time depending
on the individual cards' sale dates.20 6 Under the consent decree, Darden agrees to
restore to each card the dormancy fees it assessed and to publicize the restoration
program on its web site for two years.20 7 The FTC finally accepted the consent
decree on May 7, 2007.208
3. The Federal Injunction Action Against
Payment Processing, LLC
The term "demand drafts" refers to orders to pay ("drafts") that are (1) created
by someone other than the person whose deposit account will be debited and
(2) not signed by the person whose account will be debited. 20 9 Demand drafts





206. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, National Restaurant Company Settles FTC Charges
for Deceptive Gift Card Sales (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/darden.shtm.
207. Id.
208. In re Darden Restaurants, Inc., GMRI, Inc., and Darden GC Group, Corp., corporations, Deci-
sion and Order, Docket No. C-4189 (FTC May 7, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0623112/index.shtm.
209. The type of "demand draft" described in this part does not include the category of drafts com-
monly used in letter-of-credit transactions, which present very different issues. For more information
about "demand drafts" or "remotely created checks," see Collection of Checks and Other Items by
Federal Reserve Banks and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire and Availability of Funds and Collection
of Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. 71218 (Nov. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.ER. pts. 210 & 229) Ihere-
inafter "Collection of Checks"j; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Magazine Telemarketers
Agree To Settle FTC Charges of Debiting Consumers' Checking Accounts Without Authorization (Oct.
18, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/10/genisis.shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
Magazine Telemarketers Agree To Settle FTC Charges of Debiting Consumers' Checking Accounts
Without Authorization (Oct. 21, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/10/diverse2.shtm.
210. Collection of Checks, supra note 209, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71218.
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drafts operate like conventional "checks" in the United States as instructions to
depositary institutions to pay a specified third party Consumers use demand
drafts or remotely created checks to pay credit card companies and merchants
across the country for convenience and to avoid the risk of late payment charges
from mail delays.21' Consumers also may give information about their bank ac-
counts to creditors or marketing companies that contact them directly and that
invite payment from the consumer's checking account.2"2 Demand drafts, thus,
are used by debt collectors and by telemarketers of many kinds of products. 1 3
They also help consumers who do not have credit cards make remote payments
quickly.
2 14
"Demand drafts" have been in the news and on the minds of regulators and
state legislatures for a decade. Demand drafts that start life as paper-based obliga-
tions are subject to special rules in Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC,2"5 new
"transfer" and "presentment" warranties in Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code enacted by some states, '1 6 and a subset of the FTC's Telemarketing
Sales Rule.217 The House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has
indicated that demand drafts are on the agenda for possible congressional legisla-
tion.21 In adopting its Telemarketing Sales Rule, the FTC observed that telemarket-
ers turned to demand drafts to obtain payments from consumers when credit card
companies imposed stricter standards on credit card payments to telemarketing
firms.219 So, in a move contrary to other payment trends of the past decade or so,
paper obligations replaced electronic obligations. However, some demand drafts
211. Id. at 71218-19.
212. See id. at 71218.
213. See id. at 71218-19.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 71221-23 (defining "remotely created checks" and warranties created by remotely cre-
ated checks). Regulation CC covers only those demand drafts or "remotely created checks" that start
life with the creation of a paper draft. See id. at 71219. Remotely created "orders" not originally in
paper form would be subject to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)) and Regulation E,
12 C.ER. pt. 205 (2007), on the theory that the deposit account number serves as the "access device"
to the account, or the order is arguably not otherwise subject to any federal or state law.
216. Collection of Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71219-20 & n.12.
217. For more information about the "demand draft" provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule,
see Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, New Telemarketing Sales Rule "Strong New Weapon"
Against Demand Draft Fraud, FTC Says (Apr. 15, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/jbstest.
shtm. The Rule itself is codified at 6 C.ER. pt. 310 (2007).
218. Stacy Kaper, Check Fraud Query Made, AM. BANKER, June 12, 2007, at 19 (noting that Con-
gressman Edward Markey joined Chairman Frank in asking federal bank regulators to outline what
they propose to do with remotely created checks including (a) how fraud involving remotely created
checks compares with other bank products, (b) who bears the risk, and (c) what fraud prevention
has been attempted, including records of related enforcement actions). For the letter from Chairman
Frank and Representative Markey, see Press Release, House Committee on Financial Services, Markey
and Frank Press Banking Regulators on Loophole Used by Fraudsters (June 11, 2007), http://www.
house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs-dem/pressO61107.shtml. The letter asked for a response by
July 2, 2007. Id.
219. 16 C.ER. pt. 310 (2007) (implementing the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6101-6108 (2000 & Supp. V 2005))).
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now start as electronic obligations-hence, the reason for their mention in this
Survey-as they start to move through automated clearing houses and become
subject to different rules for electronic transactions.
There is a pending federal prosecution of Payment Processing, LLC, a non-
depositary processor of payments located in suburban Philadelphia.220 The U.S. De-
partment of Justice has alleged that Payment Processing, LLC processed "demand
drafts" on behalf of telemarketers who were engaged in fraudulent telemarket-
ing campaigns. The multi-count indictment's charges include alleged violations of
federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, and bank fraud
allegations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3322(d). 21 In addition, the U.S. Department
of Justice sought injunctive relief to freeze assets of the defendant pursuant to the
Federal Anti-Fraud Injunction Statute, which is a civil action. 222 In November,
2006, in a related civil proceeding over the right to sums held by one of the deposi-
tary banks in which Payment Processing Center, LLC held funds, the court held
that credits in Payment Processing Center's accounts with Wachovia had become
"final" and no longer were susceptible to "chargeback" by the depositary bank.223
Accordingly, the United States was entitled to restrain more than $1 million in
contested funds that belonged to the defendant, not to the bank.224
Because this is the first enforcement action against a payments processor, lawyers
advising companies taking payments by demand drafts or remotely created checks
should follow the proceeding. Lawyers also should be aware that, as mentioned
earlier, Chairman Frank has expressed interest in new legislation pertaining to the
use of demand drafts in consumer transactions as well as in clarification from the
Federal Reserve Board about the potential applicability of either Regulation CC or
Regulation E to these payment mechanisms. 225
B. REGULATORY RELIEF: THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD EXEMPTS
ISSUERS OF Low-DOLLAR DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS FROM
REGULATION E's PAPER RECEIPT REQUIREMENTS
The Federal Reserve Board announced on June 28, 2007 that it had approved
amendments to Regulation E226 to exempt transactions of $15 or less from the
220. Complaint, United States v. Payment Processing Center, LLC, No. 06-725 (E.D. Pa. July 6,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/paelNews/Pr/2007/feb/Amended%2OComplaint.pdf
[hereinafter "Complaint"]. The author of this part of the Survey has been retained as a potential expert
in this proceeding. In an ancillary proceeding, the court determined the ownership of deposits held by
depositary institutions in the name of Payment Processing Center, LLC by reference to whether "final
payment" had been made so as to preclude the depositary banks' exercise of "chargeback" pursuant to
§ 4-214 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For the most recent decision in this proceeding, see United
States v. Payment Processing Center LLC, 461 F Supp. 2d 319 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
221. Complaint, supra note 220, at 1.
222. See id. at 1-2.
223. Payment Processing Center, LLC, 461 F Supp. 2d at 326.
224. Id.
225. Press Release, House Committee on Financial Services, Markey and Frank Press Banking
Regulators on Loophole Used by Fraudsters (June 11, 2007), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/
financialsvcs-dem/press06l107.shtml.
226. 12 C.ER. pt. 205 (2007).
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requirement that receipts be made available to consumers for transactions initiated at
an electronic terminal.227 The exemption aims to facilitate consumers' ability to use
debit cards in retail transactions where making receipts available may not be practical
or cost effective. 28 The amendments became effective on August 6, 2007.219
C. THE FEDERAL UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 2006
Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
("UIGEA" or the "Act")210 on September 29, 2006. The Act establishes sanctions
including civil or criminal penalties and imprisonment for up to five years, and
prohibits gambling operations from taking payments by nearly all means cur-
rently available in the United States, including the proceeds of loan transactions,
except cash. The Act has a substantial number of exemptions, such as for state
lotteries, state-run casinos, horse racing, and fantasy sports.2 1 The four primary
provisions of the Act provide that:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in
connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling-
(1) credit, or the proceeds of credit, extended to or on behalf of such other per-
son (including credit extended through the use of a credit card);
(2) an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted... through a money trans-
mitting business, or the proceeds of an electronic funds transfer... ;
(3) any check... or similar instrument which is drawn on or payable at or
through any financial institution; or
(4) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction, as the Secretary... and
Federal Reserve may jointly prescribe by regulation .... 232
Further, the Act:
" defines unlawful Internet gambling as "to place, receive, or otherwise know-
ingly transmit a bet or wager by any means which involves the use.., of
the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable
Federal or State law in the State ... in which the bet is... made";233
" provides that "the Secretary and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall prescribe
227. Electronic Fund Transfers, 72 Fed. Reg. 36589, 36590 (July 5, 2007) (codified at 12 C.ER.
pt. 205) [hereinafter "Electronic Fund Transfers"]. The announcement also is available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070629/default.htm.
228. Electronic Fund Transfers, supra note 227, 72 Fed. Reg. at 36590.
229. Id. at 36589.
230. Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1952 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5361-5367 (West Supp.
2007)) [hereinafter "UIGEA"].
231. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stai. at 1953 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362 (West
Supp. 2007)).
232. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363 (West
Supp. 2007)).
233. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stai. at1953 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10) (West
Supp. 2007)).
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regulations... requiring each designated payment system, and all partici-
pants therein, to identify and block or otherwise prevent or prohibit re-
stricted transactions through the establishment of policies and procedures
reasonably designed to identify and block.., the acceptance of restricted
transactions .... ;234
" provides that "[tihe United States, acting through the Attorney General,
may institute proceedings... to prevent or restrain a restricted transac-
tion...," and a state attorney general may obtain a "temporary restraining
order, a preliminary injunction, or an injunction against any person to
prevent or restrain a restricted transaction...." However, "no provision of
[the] subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the Attorney General
of the United States, or the attorney general.., of any State to institute
proceedings.., against any financial transaction provider" ;131 and
" provides that "[a] ny person who violates section 5363 shall be fined... [and]
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both," and that "upon convic-
tion.., the court may enter a permanent injunction enjoining such person
from placing, receiving, or otherwise making bets or wagers .... 236
Among the more controversial aspects of the Act is its extraterritorial effect over
non-U.S. operators of Internet gambling operations.2 37 Regulations to implement
the Act, to be proposed jointly by the Secretary of the Treasury and Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System in consultation with the U.S. Department
of Justice, were to be ready nine months after enactment-or on about July 10,
2007.238 As of August 30, 2007, no regulations have been promulgated.
Although the Act requires the identification, coding, and blocking of financial
transactions to pay for unlawful Internet gambling, financial service providers
obtained two types of protections from the Act's harsh sanctions. First, financial
institutions are not covered by the UIGEA if they do not own or control or are not
owned or controlled by an entity in the business of betting or wagering. 239 Second,
financial services providers can comply by following the regulations that will be
enacted pursuant to section 5364 of Title 31. Because so many payments in sat-
isfaction of Internet gambling debts will be made of necessity in some electronic
form, readers advising financial services providers and Internet gambling opera-
tors should follow developments and the forthcoming regulations carefully 240
234. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1958 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(a) (West
Supp. 2007)).
235. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1959 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5365(b)(1),
5365(b)(2), 5365(d) (West Supp. 2007)).
236. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1961 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5366(a), (b)
(West Supp. 2007)).
237. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1961 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5366(b) (West
Supp. 2007)).
238. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1958 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(a) (West
Supp. 2007)).
239. UIGEA, supra note 230, § 802(a), 120 Stat. at 1953 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362 (West
Supp. 2007)).
240. For more discussion of the UIGEA, see Anthony Cabot, Keeping Current: Legislation-All Inter-
net Bets Are Off, Offshore, Bus. LAw TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2007, at 61.
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In June 2007, the Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association
("iMEGA") sought an injunction to restrain the United States from enforcing the
UIGEA arguing that the UIGEA "infringes on basic constitutional rights and sets a
dangerous precedent for I-commerce by criminalizing the transmission of money"
for activity that might be illegal in some locations.2 41
CONCLUSION
Developments over the past year, and particularly the Supreme Court's April
2007 decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. ,242 suggest that the laws pertaining
to stored-value and other emerging electronic payment products, and their en-
forcement, will continue to develop along two distinct tracks. The Supreme Court
has clarified that "visitorial" authority over payment providers that are federally
chartered depositary institutions or their subsidiaries is reserved to federal regula-
tors of those entities.2 43 Watters has already been cited by a court that found pre-
emption of state regulation of agents of federally chartered financial institutions, 44
and by a court that found preemption of state law usury claims against a state-
chartered, but federally insured bank.2 4 The states-and the FTC-will continue
to have authority over issuance and marketing of stored-value cards in which
federally chartered depositary institutions have no involvement. This will lead, as
noted last year, to increasing pressure on Congress to provide a national standard
governing gift cards because of the increasingly interstate nature of the merchants
issuing and marketing proprietary gift cards. Readers should stay aware of activity
in Congress responding to the Watters decision, and should keep an eye on the
House Financial Services Committee because Chairman Frank has announced his
intention of finding a means for state roles in enforcing state laws against federally
chartered banks and savings and loan associations.2 46
Congress also has shown through the enactment of the UIGEA a continued inter-
est in regulating the use of the Internet and other electronic payment products. Con-
gress passed the UIGEA despite the risk of eliciting protests from other members
of the World Trade Organization and suits from payments providers and trade
associations against its enforcement.2 47 Congress also has shown new interest in
241. See Press Release, iMEGA Corporation, iMEGA Files Lawsuit v. US Attorney General, FTC &
Federal Reserve (June 5, 2007), http://www.imega.org/2007/06/06/imega-files-lawsuit-against-
attorney-general-alberto-gonzales-the-federal-trade-commission-and-the-federal-reserve-systel. The
complaint is available at http://www.imega.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
242. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
243. Id. at 1565.
244. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, No. 06-2326, slip op. at 15 (1st Cir. May 30, 2007).
245. Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F3d 594, 605 n.11, 606 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1831(d) (2000)).
246. See Supreme Court Shuts Down Range of State Banking Laws in Gift to Predatory Lenders, STATE-
SIDE DISPATCH, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.progressivestates.org/content/596/washington-poised-to-be-
second-paid-parental-leave-state.
247. Tom Jones, World Trade Organization Weakened by Internet Gambling Case, CASINo GAMBLING
WEB, May 30, 2007, http://www.casinogamblingweb.com/gambling news/gambling-law/world-trade_
organization-weakenedby-intemet-gambling-case_.46324.html; Warren Giles, U.S. Ban on Web
Gambling Rejected, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, at DI. The government of Antigua and Barbuda filed
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consumer protection for electronic payment transactions, even if the shape of
potential regulation is not known at this time.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board has shown a desire to
clarify the scope of Regulation E248 to facilitate use of debit cards in low-dollar-
value transactions by eliminating the requirements for paper receipts for transac-
tions initiated at electronic terminals.
Federal prosecutors have pursued violations of the law by e-gold Ltd.249 and
have prosecuted one payment intermediary250 that processed "demand drafts" or
"remotely created checks" without obtaining a signature of the account holder or
using a special access device, such as an ATM card.151 Prosecutors are suing to en-
force UIGEA, and the major trade association for the Internet gambling industry,
iMEGA, has sued the U.S. Attorney General, the FTC, and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System to prevent enforcement of that Act.2 52 Finally, on
May 7, 2007, the FTC made final its consent order with Darden Restaurants,
Inc. pertaining to its gift card policies, requiring, among other things, restoration
of fees collected prior to the settlement date and notice to consumers about the
restoration of fees.253 Its earlier proposed consent decree with Kmart Corporation
was pending as of July 7, 2007.
States continue to introduce and enact laws governing the terms and conditions
of the issuance, sale, and redemption of gift and payroll cards. In the arena of pay-
roll cards, as opposed to gift cards, the states may be able to exert more control
over the terms on which cards are offered for a while longer because of the large
role the states traditionally have played in the regulation of employers' payment
of wages and salaries to employees. States' ability to enforce their new laws is at
odds with the decision in Watters, as previously explained.
Looking forward, there are signals that the U.S. Department of the Treasury is
interested in deterring the use of stored-value cards by money launderers, despite
the absence of evidence to this point of any such use. The hypothesis that money
launderers will find stored-value and other electronic payment products useful in
their quest to evade detection by worldwide law enforcement officials remains a
potent force in Treasury's plans to thwart money laundering and terrorism finance
globally How Treasury proposes to proceed may be clearer as next year's Survey of
Cyberspace Law goes to print.
WTO compensation requests against the United States seeking $3.4 billion a year from the United States
for its failure to comply with the WHO ruling that U.S. Internet gambling restrictions are illegal. Lorraine
Woellen, A Web Gambling Fight Could Harm Free Trade, Bus. WK., Aug. 13, 2007, at 43.
248. Electronic Fund Transfers, supra note 227, 71 Fed. Reg. 69430.
249. See supra notes 142-97 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
251. Id.
252. See Press Release, iMEGA Corporation, iMEGA Files Lawsuit v. US Attorney General, FTC &
FederalReserve(June5,2007),http://www.imega.org(2007/06/06/imega-files-lawsuit-against-attomey-
general-alberto-gonzales-the-federal-trade-commission-and-the-federal-reserve-systen/.
253. In re Darden Restaurants, Inc., GMRI, Inc., and Darden GC Group, Corp., corporations, Deci-
sion and Order, Docket No. C-4189 (FTC May 7, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0623112/index.shtm.

